New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd and their excessive free allocations of emission units

This post is sort of a 'review article' post synthesizing all my previous posts about New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited and how their overly generous free allocation of emission units under the emissions trading scheme shields them from a carbon price. NB also posted at Robin Johnson's Economics Web page..

In each year that New Zealand has had an emissions trading scheme, the trans-national company New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited was given a very generous 'free allocation' of emission units. First, back in 2010, and in the years following and, bringing us up to date, in 2015.

I have written several blog posts about these free allocations. In the very beginning, back on 7 October 2011, I wrote 150% Pure Subsidy which was also posted at Hot Topic as 120% Pure Subsidy.

In that post I argued that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited, the operator of the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter, was being 'over-allocated' emission units under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (the "ETS"). That the company was being given more free emission units than the emission units it was required to surrender for it's emissions. And therefore the company was not 'facing a carbon price' under the emissions trading scheme. It was being shielded from the carbon price. In other words, the allocation of free emissions units acted as an 'insurance policy' against ever facing a carbon price.

The company was given an industrial allocation of 210,421 units for the six months from 1 July to 31 December 2010. I estimated that the smelter company was required to surrender between 143,000 and 172,000 emissions units for the six months to 31 December 2010. Therefore the estimated degree of over-allocation of units was between 120% and 147%.

The over allocation is obvious, I thought, when we compare the emissions factor (as used in our greenhouse gas inventories) of producing a tonne of aluminium, with the allocation 'baseline', the number of emission units allocated per tonne of aluminium produced.

In the CRF tables/spreadsheets (20MB zip file) released with New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2014, the 2010 emissions factor for producing a tonne of aluminium is 1.67 tonnes of carbon dioxide with an additional 0.14 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent for perfluorocarbon (PFC).

In October 2011, the Climate Change (Eligible Industrial Activities) Regulations 2010 specified that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited was allocated 2.556 emission units per tonne of aluminium produced in 2010.

That allocation 'baseline', 2.556 units per tonne of production, exceeded the 'inventory' emissions factor in carbon dioxide equivalent (1.67 + 0.14 = 1.81) by a factor of 1.4. As indicated in this bar chart, which you could say represents a mental model of how the free allocation works.

Then, on 20 October 2011, I wrote 120% Pure Subsidy: Part 2 which was also cross-posted at Hot Topic.

In that post, I was given feedback that the free allocation of units to emitting industries included extra units for "ETS electricity pass-through costs".

As the report "Development of industrial allocation regulations under the New Zealand emissions trading scheme: Consultation document, (MfE December 2009, ME 984) stated;

"A number of energy-intensive firms will face higher costs of production because of the electricity used in their production"

because, Q.E.D.

"The NZ ETS will increase the costs of generating electricity from fossil fuels and geothermal sources".

This was also explicit in the original Labour Government report "The Framework for a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme" of 2007.

It stated in the fourth bullet point to subsection '5.3.1 In-principle decision on levels of assistance through free allocation' (with my underlining), that;

“indirect emissions associated with the consumption of electricity, as well as direct emissions from ... industrial processes will be included in the concept of emissions from industrial producers ... The basis for allocation for electricity consumption will be one that compensates firms for the cost impact”.

However, the total free allocation for both direct emissions and the 'ETS electricity pass-through costs' "would operate within a total envelope of assistance to industry defined as 90 per cent of 2005 emission levels", (subsection 6.5.2.1 Free allocation Level of total assistance to industry).

This allocation 'envelope' (almost a 'cap') of 90 percent of 2005 emissions was dropped in the 2010 Cabinet Paper "EGI Min (10) 14/9".

For highly emissions-intensive trade-exposed emitters, the allocations would be based on actual production (i.e. an 'intensity' basis where allocation would increase if production increased) for the industry (Paragraph 14). The 90 percent (of historic emissions) became a "90% level of assistance" (Paragraph 20) which then became an input to the formula for calculating the allocation number; 'Allocation (in units) = Level of Assistance × Quantity of Production × Allocative Baseline' (Paragraph 32).

The 2010 Cabinet Paper "EGI Min (10) 14/9" established a proxy for the 'ETS electricity pass-through costs', the electricity allocation factor (to calculate ‘emissions’ per megawatt hour of electricity used, paragraph 8) as stated in paragraph 37:

An electricity allocation factor of 0.52 tCO2-e/MWh has been used to calculate proposed allocative baselines. This was the factor proposed in 2008 by the Stationary Energy and Industrial Process Technical Advisory Group (SEIP TAG) to offset the expected increase in electricity price as a result of the introduction of the NZ ETS. This factor was intended to reflect increases in electricity price to the end of 2012 and will need to be periodically updated.

So the counter argument is that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited faces a carbon price through increased electricity costs rather than through the number of emission units surrendered for it's direct emissions.

We may say the allocation baseline has two parts; a direct emissions baseline and and an electricity/(energy) baseline. The free allocation of additional units for the ETS electricity costs lessens the impact of that carbon price (without removing it entirely). This bar chart, where the allocation baseline is less than the sum of the various emissions costs, is the mental model for this narrative for the free allocation.

However, the bar chart isn't the last word. I just made up the numbers to show the idea.

Free allocation to the smelter includes ETS electricity costs. What could possibly go wrong?

Back in the mid-2000s, when the ETS was being developed, what else did we know about the New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited electricity contract with Meridian?

We knew it was secret, controversial and far too cheap. Brian Fallow in 2004 estimated the electricity price to be just over 5c a kilowatt hour. Another 2008 cost estimate was $52-$54 a MWh (5.2c - 5.4c a kilowatt hour. CAFCA thought the cost in 2007 was 4.7 c a kilowatt hour.

Brian Fallow also points out the pre-2013 contract exposed perhaps 10 per cent of the supply to the floating wholesale price and that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters were very sensitive about varying wholesale costs when the hydro lakes had low storage levels.

The design of the generous free allocation regime moved the 'discounted' (but apparently still real) ETS 'carbon' price away from the direct emissions and to the ETS electricity pass through costs of an aggressive transnational company with the largest volume, cheapest and most secretive electricity contract in New Zealand. It would be harder to think of a policy more likely to result in regulatory capture (See Internet Archive) and rent-seeking.

The fact that unit allocations include indirect energy costs may make emitters net sellers of units

There is one other important implication of upstream (ETS-related) energy costs being included in the 'allocation baseline'. The total allocation may well be greater than 100% of their direct emissions. But that doesn't matter if the emitter still faces some reduced electricity ETS cost pass-through.

The big 'emission intensive' and 'trade exposed' emitters will always be net sellers of emission units. It very hard to see how a net seller of emission units is, as Nick Smith liked to say, "facing a carbon price".

As an example, there wasn't much doubt that New Zealand Steel's direct allocation of units exceeded their emissions liability.

As Jan Wright observed in her submission on the electricity allocation factor:

"The pertinent question, then, is how much electricity prices will increase as a result of carbon pricing. But electricity price increases are very hard to predict, due to the complexities of the New Zealand electricity market and the need to cater for rising electricity demand. Despite the difficulty, it is imperative the number of credits given to industry to offset electricity price increases should be accurately - and transparently - determined."

The critical questions are therefore "What are the extra costs to the smelter of thermally generated electricity caused specifically by the emissions trading scheme? How are these extra costs measured? Are the costs and method of measurement transparently disclosed?"

It's not classic cap and trade its a double-dip

Let's just be very clear that this idea of the allocation base including upstream ETS energy costs is conceptually a departure from the classic 'cap and trade' model of emissions trading. In strict cap and trade, with a real cap on emissions, and with 'grand-parented' free allocation of the 'capped' units to emitters, the energy sector would be allocated a share of the cap to reflect their direct emissions from energy generation. That allocation, being a part of the finite cap, could not go to both the energy companies with thermal fossil-fuel generation and to the 'downstream' industrial emitters.

In other words, the allocation of extra units to industries because of additional 'up-stream' carbon-intensive energy costs caused by the emissions trading scheme, is the allocation that would have gone to the energy companies in the classic model. That would not be possible in true 'all-sectors' emissions trading scheme with a real cap. It's only possible in our emissions trading scheme because it only applies to parts of the economy and as it is uncapped.

But lets get back to the issue of the 'ETS electricity pass-through costs'. At the time of 120% Pure Subsidy: Part 2 I argued that it was a nonsense for the free allocation of units to a smelter to include a compensation factor for upstream carbon-intensive electricity costs, when that smelter owed it's existence to a dedicated source of hydroelectric generation from Lake Manapōuri. Also the generator the smelter contracts it's electricity from is the 100% renewable Meridian Energy.

The counter argument is that that the contract (or contracts) with Meridian prices some proportion of the electricity supplied at the whatever the wholesale price is at a point in time. And as explained by Brian Fallow, the wholesale price may include an ETS component when coal generation is setting the marginal price.

Then, on 2 November 2011, I wrote Nick Smith fails the smelter spin test, also cross-posted at Hot Topic.

In that post, I argued that the then Minister for Climate Change Issues Nick Smith was incorrect in saying that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters faced a carbon price and that European aluminium smelters did not. Even though the European smelters were not (at that time) participants in the European emissions trading system, the (upstream) electricity sector was and therefore there was a carbon price passed 'downstream' to the smelters from the more carbon-intensive European electricity generators.

On 23 April 2012, I reported that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited had won the 2011 Roger Award for being the worst transnational company operating in New Zealand.

On 9 September 2012, I wrote Power to the smelter? New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited wants to pay less for electricity for the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter. That post noted that New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited was renegotiating the electricity supply contract with Meridian Energy.

I concluded that New Zealand Aluminium Smelter Limited had breathtaking audacity in threatening to close the Tiwai Point Smelter if they didn't get lower electricity costs, when they already enjoyed the lowest electricity cost of any sector in New Zealand. In 2011 New Zealand Aluminium Smelter Limited paid the very lowest average rate for electricity in New Zealand; 5.03 cents per kilowatt-hour! Residential users paid 22.6 cents per kilowatt-hour, or four times as much.

On 11 September 2012, I riffed off a gangster meme and wrote the evocatively-titled Rio Tinto Alcan New Zealand Ltd plays godfather: nice aluminium smelter you got, be a shame if something happened to it, also at Hot Topic.

I noted that New Zealand Aluminium Smelter Limited was again threatening to close the smelter and in effect saying "Shame if something happens to" the smelter workforce, the Southland economy, the New Zealand electricity market, Meridian Energy and the conservation program for the critically endangered kakapo.

For a couple of years, I didn't really think about smelter until I looked at the Official Information Act releases by the NZ Treasury about the New Zealand Government's payment of $30 million to New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited in 2013.

Amongst the dozens of documents was an email between officials with a familiar title which made me laugh; Email to Officials: Rio Tinto Alcan NZ Plays Godfather: Nice Aluminium Smelter you got, be a shame if something happened to it.

In this email, one official noted to another that Meridian Chief Executive Mark Binns had emailed them asking if the electricity costs mentioned in my Hot Topic blog post were correct and that yes the numbers were correct!

Another couple of years went by. As they tend to. Then, on 9 April 2016 of this year, I wrote Opening up the data on emissions units in the NZ emissions trading scheme. In that post I noted with some surprise that the updated data on free emissions unit allocations showed that New Zealand Aluminium Smelter's 2013 allocation had increased by a factor of five from the 2012 allocation. And of course I made a bar chart.

So what happened in 2013? The free allocation increased from 301,244 units in 2012 to 1,524,172 units.

What happened was that the 2013 allocative baseline for aluminium production changed from 2.062 units per tonne to 10.441 units per tonne. As you can see from this bar chart.

Wrapping it all up

In hindsight, it's obvious from the June 2010 Cabinet paper Industrial Allocation under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme: Group One Activities, Ref no: EGI Min (10) 14/9 that although there was a generic 'electricity allocation factor' of of 0.52 tCO2-e/MWh, that would not apply to New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited.

They would instead have a 'bespoke' arrangement for the electricity component of the allocation baseline.

This apparently involves an annual "reading" of the highly confidential ultra-cheap electricity supply contract with Meridian. There are a number of potentially ambiguous statements about how this is done.

Paragraph 38 states;

"Specific electricity supply arrangements mean it is appropriate to prescribe specific allocative baselines for aluminium smelting. The Act contains the ability to adjust allocative baselines where particular electricity supply arrangements affect the electricity price increase a particular firm faces. The rationale for this power is to prevent large over-allocations where electricity related contracts prevent a full pass-through of electricity costs."

Paragraphs 40 is in first-person and active tense (think of Nick Smith speaking confidently) and it states (with my underlining)

"I have since used my powers under section 161D of the Act to request electricity contracts and related information from NZAS. [Deleted] In particular the analysis suggests:

1. An average pass-through of electricity costs to NZAS during the transition phase (until 2013) of [Deleted] compared with the pass through of 0.52 tCO2-e/MWh that would otherwise be assumed.
2. Using the default pass-through of 0.52 tCO2-e/MWh would result in an average over-allocation to NZAS of [Deleted] during the transition phase.
3. The actual pass-through to NZAS during the 2010 to 2012 period is likely to be significantly higher or lower than the average value above".

So it's not just a matter of reading the contract. There is also "related information" from New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited. There is also an "analysis". This "analysis" suggests that actual annual pass-through electricity costs vary from year to year and may be more or less than than the electricity allocation baseline. However, in spite of this variability, the average pass-through electricity costs for the years 2010 to 2012 is known (but has been deleted to keep it confidential) and is less than 0.52 tCO2-e/MWh.

Paragraph 9 of the Executive Summary states a fairly firm conclusion;

"Information obtained from New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) enables electricity pass-through costs that NZAS faces for 2010 to be determined with reasonable certainty at this point."

Paragraph 41 states; "to reflect the actual electricity costs to NZAS, the allocative baseline for NZAS would need to be amended at the beginning of 2011, 2012 and 2013 to ensure that final allocations more accurately reflect the pass-through of electricity costs to NZAS".

So, in conclusion, the Ministry for the Environment has set up a regulatory process where New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited is enabled and encouraged to annually provide the Ministry with "related information" and "analysis" of the electricity contract - in order to set the allocation baseline and therefore the number of free units they will be allocated. And this information analysis is not disclosed. It's hard not to conclude that this bespoke process allows New Zealand Aluminium Smelters to annually nominate it's preferred free allocation of emission units.

Opening up the data or webscrape the 2015 free allocation of emission units from MfE

Let's look at the latest data on the very generous free give-aways of emissions units to emitters made by the Ministry for the Environment
(N.B. Update on 10 December 2016. The allocation decisions have moved to the web page of the Environmental Protection Authority. And the "importHTML" function in Google sheets does not work on the EPA pages.)

The Ministry for the Environment has up dated its webpage 2015 Industrial Allocation Decisions to show the final 2015 free allocation of emission units to emitters under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme.

I looked at the 2010 to 2014 data in my post Opening up the data on emissions units in the NZ emissions trading scheme. So in this post I am will repeat my steps in web-scraping the freebie emissions unit data into a sensible open format.

The url of the webpage is http://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions/new-zealand-emissions-trading-scheme/participatin-4

Go to Google and open a new Google sheet.

Enter this text in cell A1 of the Google sheet.

=importHTML("http://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/reducing-greenhouse-gas-emissions/new-zealand-emissions-trading-scheme/participatin-4","table",1)

That worked perfectly! We have a Google sheet of the 2015 free unit allocation to NZ emissions trading scheme emitters.

I have saved it as NZETS-2015-final-allocations-for-eligible-activities.

However, the first column includes both industry names and types of industries classified by the type of emissions the industry produces. And lots of asterisks. Any sensible format would have these attributes as separate columns so that each company/emitter would have a row each.

So I used a programme called Open Refine to data-wrangle the data into that format and to save it as a comma-separated values file which is this Google sheet NZETS-2015-final-allocations-for-eligible-activities. Its a bit fiddly using Open Refine, so I won't describe how I did it.

This is the updated free emission unit allocation data from 2010 to 2015.

As usual, the big emitters get the most emission units! Of 4.417 million units allocated to industries, 90% went to 11 large companies. New Zealand Steel Development Limited, of arbitrage profits fame, gets 1,067,501 free units. New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited gets 772,706 free units.

I did a bit of data visualising and created this pie-chart in R programming language.

The R script for that is

Did I not get the End the Rainbow memo? So I picked a better colour scale from Colour Brewer.

The R script for this non-rainbow pie chart is:

Morgan Foundation's Climate Cheats II: Who’s the Real Cheat Here? The Dozen Dirty Now thats a title!

Geoff Simmons and the Morgan Foundation have done it again! They have just released a sequel to 'Climate Cheats', the fantastically-named 'Who’s the Real Cheat Here? Climate Cheats II: The Dozen Dirty Businesses'. Simon Johnson breathlessly reviews Climate Cheats II and concludes that while it's about time we had some transparency over Government and corporate shenanigans with emissions trading, we mustn't forget that these are symptoms of the root problem - the uncapped design of the New Zealand emissions trading scheme.

Shock Newsflash Horror! The Morgan Foundation and Geoff "Wild-Shirt" Simmons have done it again! They have just released another tell-all critique of corporate emissions trading shenanigans! A sequel in the franchise they started in April 2016 with the report Climate Cheats. As we know, 'Cheats I' outlined this sad course of events:

• the 'flood' of low-cost and low-integrity Russian and Ukrainian emissions reduction units into the NZ emission unit market
• which then crashed the domestic emission unit price
• which allowed NZ emitters to meet emissions trading obligations for next to nothing
• which allowed the Government to own surplus (but dodgy) units
• which meant Paula Bennett could claim 'form over substance' compliance with climate charge targets out to 2020
• not withstanding the real increases in both gross and net NZ emissions of greenhouse gases.

Weighing in at a thankfully concise 16 pages, the wonderfully named 'Who’s the Real Cheat Here? Climate Cheats II: The Dozen Dirty Businesses' starts with a simple question. Which companies had the most dodgy Russian and Ukrainian emission units? Well, here they are.

Simmons and co then note that Minister Bennett has refused requests to cancel the surplus dodgy units the Government holds, giving the excuse she is 'seeking advice' (That would seem to be a perpetually applicable excuse!). So they ask 'who owned and used dodgy emission reduction units?' The dirty dozen corporates, of course.

The report then discusses three types of liability (physical, liability and transition) that may fall on companies who used the emission reduction units. To paraphrase, Simmons is thinking 'did they really think this would never come back and bit them?' And he is making the point that if Government is failing to act ethically, then why don't we shine a spotlight on our corporate citizens and ask them to shoulder some of the responsibility for the dodgy unit fiasco?

Simmons assigns highest culpability to New Zealand Steel and Fonterra. Because they are emitters who received generous free allocations of NZ units but who also owned dodgy emission reduction units. Referencing a blogger (meaning me!), the report notes New Zealand Steel booked $4.4 million Australian dollars of profit from emissions trading that is probably from arbitrage trading of their free NZ units while also owning dodgy units.

Five forestry companies are on the dozen list. Some sympathy is due to some of them as the unit price crash devalued their allocations of units. But none is due to any foresters who carried out 'forest re-registration arbitrage' in the ETS. This was exiting and re-entering the same forest in and out of the ETS several times. For each ETS 'exit', the forester would 'square-up' the refund of carbon liabilities with emission reduction units costing several cents each. For each 're-entry' to the ETS, the forester would be given an allocation of free NZ emissions units worth a few dollars each. The result being instant no-effort windfall profits. The Government took far to long to clamp down on this practice.

Finally, energy companies get their turn in the spotlight. BP, Chevron, Z Energy, Contact Energy and Genesis Energy all owned and used some dodgy international units. Did these companies price their products to NZ customers on the basis of the higher NZ unit prices or the lower dodgy unit price? The Morgan Foundation approached the energy companies for comment which is in an appendix. All give worthy statements saying they followed the rules and of course they put customers first. However, Mobil shows up the fine words of the others. Mobil never owned any dodgy international units and managed to supply fuel just as competitively as the others.

Climate Cheats II concludes by suggesting that the companies who owned dodgy international units and lowered their costs (as well as those who made windfall profits) have two options to put things right.

1. They could voluntarily cancel NZ units to match the dodgy units used
2. They could alternatively pressure Paula Bennett to cancel the surplus units the Government holds.

With NZ emission unit prices now hovering between $17 and $18 per tonne, the latter option will hurt much less than the former.

In summary, it's hard not to like a Morgan Foundation report that references me! But leaving that bias/good taste aside, Climate Cheats II is a concise readable summary of the abject state of New Zealand's emissions targets and trading policies and practices. As Kevin Anderson would say, we need to see clearly where our rose-tinted spectacles have brought us. Climate Cheats II mostly does that.

However, if anything, the report, by focusing on the top dozen owners of the dodgy international units, underplays the persuasiveness of the ownership and use of those international units. Most entities with emissions trading accounts owned some dodgy units. In 2013, more than 400 entities (out of 496 account holders) owned some share of the almost 35 million emission reduction units in private hands. You can check this with this Google sheet of Kyoto Units obtained from the Emission Unit Register at the EPA.

Finally, I have one concern which is perhaps more about how 'Climate Cheats II' will be received rather than what message it has. It seemed to me that the media response to initial splash of 'Climate Cheats I' (they loved the emotive framing - 'fraud!' - 'cheating!') really missed the fundamental point that I think both reports support, and that other assessments of the ETS support, that an emissions trading scheme that has no cap on emissions, that earns no revenue and that isn't economy-wide, is an excuse and rationalisation for doing nothing and not an effective mitigation policy at all.

Minister for Climate Change Issues Paula Bennett and the surplus emission units

A wee while ago, back on 23 May to be precise, I wrote an open letter to Minister for Climate Change Issues Paula Bennett calling on her to cancel the surplus Kyoto emission units held by the Crown.

I received an undated reply from Bennett on Monday 4 July 2016.

To crudely sum it up, Bennett's reply is "No we won't cancel any units. Those bad bad Ukrainian units! It was bad. But we stopped being bad, we won't bad again, at any rate no more bad than any one else!"

Here is the text of Bennett's letter. For reference, I have put the text of my open letter at the bottom of this post.

Thank you for your letter of 23 May 2016 about surplus Kyoto Protocol assigned amount units.

As you say, the Government has a surplus of 123.7 million Kyoto Protocol emission units which were left over after we retired units to meet our target for the first Kyoto commitment period.

I accept that there were up to 97 million Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) bought and surrendered in the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) before the Government stopped accepting them. That was within the rules, but we now know many of the ERUs are likely to have had poor environmental integrity. We are not accepting international units now, and we are working hard to make sure any international units traded in the NZ ETS in the future are of high environmental integrity. We are reviewing the NZ ETS to make sure it will be fit for purpose in the future.

As we have said in the past, we will meet our target of -5 per cent by 2020 using a combination of domestic abatement, forestry removals, and some international purchasing. There is information about the target on the Ministry for the Environment website at www.mfe.govt.nz.

We have not made a decision about what to do with any Kyoto units that are left over after we have met the 2020 target.

Nearly all other Kyoto developed countries also have surpluses. Some of them have said they will cancel units, but haven't actually cancelled them yet. There is no urgency to do anything with these units, and the fact that we are not cancelling them at this stage doesn't put us out of step with other countries.

---

Let's look a little harder at three statements in Bennett's letter.

1. "We are not accepting international units now"
   Bennett is implying that the New Zealand Government made an express decision to stop the importing of some low-integrity international emission units. In fact, New Zealand ended up with no access to international carbon markets when Tim Groser told the UNFCCC that New Zealand was not going to have a formal emissions reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol for 2013 to 2020. Ms Bennett and the Ministry for the Environment should stop implying that some positive decision was made. Its just not true.
2. "we will meet our target of -5 per cent by 2020 using a combination of domestic abatement, forestry removals, and some international purchasing."
   The translation of this spin back into plain language is 'we will still be using creative carbon accounting' to pretend we are reducing emissions when we know we are not. Bennett should really stop saying such a disingenuous statement. The Ministry for the Environment's 2020 Net Position Statement still explicitly shows the 123.7 million surplus units plugging the gap.
3. "not cancelling them... doesn't put us out of step with other countries"
   Heaven forbid that New Zealand should be out of step with the many other countries who are also doing nothing about climate change!

My open letter to Paula Bennett - Your ethical duty to cancel 124 million surplus assigned amount units

Dear Minister,

I see that last Friday (20 May 2016) the Ministry for the Environment released New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2014 and the summary 'Snapshot'.

I see that in the Snapshot summary on Figure 5, page 5, that New Zealand is still intending to use 123.7 million emission units (Assigned Amount Units or 'AAUs') that were 'surplus' from the Kyoto Protocol first Commitment Period to meet the 2020 emissions reduction target and still have a surplus of 92.6 million units.

You are aware that the Morgan Foundation's report 'Climate Cheats' and the Stockholm Environment Institute report (Kollmuss, Schneider and Zhezherin 2015) set out a persuasive case that the 97 million Emission Reduction Units ('ERUs') that were imported to New Zealand were “questionable or of low environmental integrity”. Those ERUs were surrendered by NZETS participants into Crown holding accounts.

According to the Kyoto Protocol 'True-Up' Report, in December 2015, the Ministry for the Environment cancelled (transferred Crown-owned units to cancellation accounts) 373 million emission units to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The numbers and types of units cancelled were: the 97 million imported ERUs, 16 million imported Certified Emission Reduction units ('CERs'), 81 million removal units ('RMUs'), and 179 million AAUs . The 'surplus' units remaining in Crown holding accounts were 124 million AAUs.

In a nutshell, the only reason New Zealand (the Crown) has so many 'surplus' AAUs is because of the inflow and use of the dubious ERUs in the NZETS. Each dubious imported ERU has allowed one additional AAU to be carried forward in a Crown holding account as a 'surplus' unit. Because the ERUs have no credibility, the AAUs no longer represent carbon safely stored out of the atmosphere. No emissions were reduced. Therefore to use these surplus AAUs to comply with the national 2020 emission reduction target is simply an exercise in creative carbon accounting. It is simply unethical.

I put it to you that as Minister for Climate Change Issues, you are morally obliged to cancel these surplus units owned by the Crown. Will you cancel the units? It may hopefully to some small extent restore New Zealand’s very tarnished reputation with respect to mitigating climate change policy.

Yours sincerely

Emissions Trading Scheme unit allocations are open data but units surrendered and actual emissions are state secrets

It would be good if we could compare actual company emissions under the NZETS to the generous free allocations of unit some entities receive. But we can't. It's half secret. So how will we ever know if allocations are excessive?

Someone recently asked me if there was enough publicly available information to be able to tell how the free allocation of NZ emission units to some privileged ETS participants under the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme related to the emitters actual emissions of greenhouse gases.

This information would be the number of emission units allocated to some emitters on the one hand, and on the other hand, the actual emissions of the emitters as reported to the Environmental Protection Authority and the actual numbers of corresponding emission units they surrender to the Environmental Protection Authority.

I replied "No, the data is not available". A response which, although it contains a grain of truth, still doesn't reflect the whole story. So this post is an attempt at that story.

In the past few years, I have written several posts about the significance of the free allocation of emission units to New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd, Norske Skog Tasman and New Zealand Steel. In each case I concluded that the free allocation of units (including units for energy costs) were excessive. That these were cases of 'over-allocation'.

In those posts I had to make estimates of the actual emissions and actual units surrendered. Although the Ministry for the Environment completely discloses the annual free allocation of units, neither the Ministry or the Environmental Protection Authority report the emissions and units surrendered by entity.

As I noted recently I have compiled a Google sheet of all units allocated to emitters from 2010 to 2014.

So good on the Ministry for the Environment. A while ago I made this pie chart of the 2011 allocations from the Ministry. Yes, awful rainbow colours I know! But it still makes it clear that the vast bulk of free units get allocated to the top ten or so emitters - who happen to also be some of New Zealand's largest and most influential companies.

I was running out of emitters like NZ Steel and NZ Aluminium Smelters Ltd who both have unique operations. Both are the only example of their industry in New Zealand. So I could look at 'category' emissions for 'aluminium smelting' and 'steel making from iron sands' in the Ministry for the Environment's greenhouse gas inventory reports and be confident the category emissions were the same as the company emissions.

So, back on 28 March 2013, I made a request under the Official Information Act (OIA) to the Environmental Protection Authority, who administer the reporting of emissions and surrendering of units in the ETS.

I asked for number of units surrendered by the top eleven ETS participants (New Zealand Steel Limited, New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited, Methanex New Zealand Limited, Fletcher Concrete and Infrastructure Limited, Ballance Agri-Nutrients Limited, Holcim (New Zealand) Limited, Carter Holt Harvey Pulp & Paper Limited, Pan Pac Forest Products Limited, McDonalds Lime Limited, Winstone Pulp International Limited, Whakatane Mill Limited) for 2010 and 2011.

On 18 April 2013, the Environmental Protection Authority declined my request.

On 19 April 2013 I made a complaint about the EPA decision to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Almost a year later, on 8 April 2014, the Ombudsman concluded his investigation and said that the EPA were correct in refusing to give me the information as the Climate Change Response Act 2002 explicitly applies to the surrender of units in priority to the Official Information Act 1982.

The Deputy Ombudsman Leo Donnelly advised that he agreed with the EPA view that they did not have to provide the information on units surrendered. This is the key passage from his letter dated 8 April 2014.

"I am not persuaded that the Official Information Act is an Act that provides for the disclosure of information in s 99(2)(a) of the Climate Change Response Act.
The Official Information Act confers a right to request official information and requires that such requests be processed in accordance with its provisions, but those provisions do not provide for the disclosure of information under the Climate Change Response Act (or any other Act that imposes restrictions on the availability of official information).
Instead, section 52(3)(b)(i) of the Official Information Act provides that nothing in that Act derogates from any provision which is contained in any other Act which imposes a prohibition or restriction in relation to the availability of official information. Section 99 is such a section.
Accordingly, the Official Information Act does not override the restrictions imposed by section 99 of the Climate Change Response Act and it would be contrary to that section for the requested information to be made available to you. Consequently, section 18(c)(1) of the Official Information Act provides a reason to refuse your request on that basis."

I was bloody disappointed with that response. Here is the Ombudsman's letter. I also didn't know that the Official Information Act only applies if another statute allows it too. I will look at the relevant sections in detail.

Section 52(3)(b)(i) of the Official Information Act states;

(3) Except as provided in sections 50 and 51, nothing in this Act derogates from—
(a) ....
(b) any provision which is contained in any other Act of Parliament or in any regulations within the meaning of the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 (made by Order in Council and in force immediately before 1 July 1983) and which—
(i) imposes a prohibition or restriction in relation to the availability of official information;...

So if another statute (or regulation) prohibits or restricts the availability of official information, then that statute or regulation applies irrespective of the Official Information Act.

Section 99 of the Climate Change Response Act certainly appears to prohibit the availability of information. It states;

This section applies—
(a) to the chief executive, the EPA, an enforcement officer, and any other person who performs functions or exercises powers of the chief executive, the EPA, or an enforcement officer under this Part and Part 5; and
(b) at the time during which, and any time after which, those functions are performed or those powers are exercised.
(2) A person to whom this section applies—
(a) must keep confidential all information that comes into the person’s knowledge when performing any function or exercising any power under this Part and Part 5; and
(b) may not disclose any information specified in paragraph (a), except—
(i) with the consent of the person to whom the information relates or of the person to whom the information is confidential; or
(ii) to the extent that the information is already in the public domain; or
(iii) for the purposes of, or in connection with, the exercise of powers conferred by this Part or for the administration of this Act; or
(iiia) for the purposes of, or in connection with, reporting requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989; or (iv) as provided under this Act or any other Act; or
(v) in connection with any investigation or inquiry (whether or not preliminary to any proceedings) in respect of, or any proceedings for, an offence against this Act or any other Act; or
(vi) for the purpose of complying with any obligation under the Convention or the Protocol.
(3) A person to whom this section applies commits an offence under section 130 if the person knowingly contravenes this section.....

So why does the Ministry for the Environment publish the annual allocations of units on its website? Why is the policy for unit allocation effectively open data (with complete public disclosure) when the policy for emissions and units surrendered in the ETS, the policy is 'Official Secrets Act?

The answer is the perfect bureaucrat's answer, because the Act says so. Section 86B Decisions on applications for allocations of New Zealand units to industry and agriculture of the Climate Change Response Act states:

(5) The EPA must, as soon as practicable, after deciding an eligible person’s final allocation for an eligible activity in respect of a year,—
(a) publish the decision in the Gazette; and
(b) ensure it is accessible via the Internet site of the EPA.

Where does this leave us? It's the old story of the three-handed forestry consultant. 'On the one hand, on the second hand, but on the third hand..' Its great that the data on free allocation of units to emitters is fully disclosed. I am sure many of them wouldn't want that. However, without data on units surrendered and actual annual emissions under the ETS, no one can make much of an assessment of whether the units allocated are reasonable or over-allocated in terms of exceeding actual emissions. Transparency (and legitimacy) would be very much improved if the actual emissions and unit surrenders were just as open as the unit allocations

An open letter to Minister for Climate Change Issues Paula Bennett cancel the dubious surplus units

In which I write to Paula Bennett and ask her to cancel the 124 million surplus emission units.

Paula Bennett's first act as the new Minister for Climate Change Issues was to announce that yes indeed New Zealand would be using creative carbon accounting and shuffling of dubious 'surplus' emissions units to meet the 2020 climate change target without actually reducing any emissions of greenhouse gases.

That approach became unstuck for Paula Bennett with the release of the Morgan Foundation's 'Climate Cheats' report.

Report author Geoff Simmons pretty convincingly put the case that if New Zealand has unethically benefited from buying dubious Ukrainian emission units, then Paula Bennett is ethically bound to cancel the remaining surplus units. I have heard no response, so I thought I would ask her myself. Hence this letter.

Hey why don't you write or email her too? Her email address is paula.bennett@parliament.govt.nz

The Hon Paula Bennett
Minister for Climate Change Issues
Parliament Office
Private Bag 18888
Parliament Buildings, Wellington 6160

23 May 2016

Your ethical duty to cancel 124 million surplus assigned amount units

Dear Minister,

I see that last Friday (20 May 2016) the Ministry for the Environment released New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2014 and the summary 'Snapshot'.

I see that in the Snapshot summary on Figure 5, page 5, that New Zealand is still intending to use 123.7 million emission units (Assigned Amount Units or 'AAUs') that were 'surplus' from the Kyoto Protocol first Commitment Period to meet the 2020 emissions reduction target and still have a surplus of 92.6 million units.

You are aware that the Morgan Foundation's report 'Climate Cheats' and the Stockholm Environment Institute report (Kollmuss, Schneider and Zhezherin 2015) set out a persuasive case that the 97 million Emission Reduction Units ('ERUs') that were imported to New Zealand were “questionable or of low environmental integrity”. Those ERUs were surrendered by NZETS participants into Crown holding accounts.

According to the Kyoto Protocol 'True-Up' Report, in December 2015, the Ministry for the Environment cancelled (transferred Crown-owned units to cancellation accounts) 373 million emission units to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The numbers and types of units cancelled were: the 97 million imported ERUs, 16 million imported Certified Emission Reduction units ('CERs'), 81 million removal units ('RMUs'), and 179 million AAUs . The 'surplus' units remaining in Crown holding accounts were 124 million AAUs.

In a nutshell, the only reason New Zealand (the Crown) has so many 'surplus' AAUs is because of the inflow and use of the dubious ERUs in the NZETS. Each dubious imported ERU has allowed one additional AAU to be carried forward in a Crown holding account as a 'surplus' unit. Because the ERUs have no credibility, the AAUs no longer represent carbon safely stored out of the atmosphere. No emissions were reduced. Therefore to use these surplus AAUs to comply with the national 2020 emission reduction target is simply an exercise in creative carbon accounting. It is simply unethical.

I put it to you that as Minister for Climate Change Issues, you are morally obliged to cancel these surplus units owned by the Crown. Will you cancel the units? It may hopefully to some small extent restore New Zealand’s very tarnished reputation with respect to mitigating climate change policy.

Yours sincerely

Did New Zealand Steel make windfall arbitrage profits from the New Zealand emissions trading scheme?

In the wake of the Morgan Foundations hard-hitting report "Climate Cheats", Simon Johnson (aka Mr February) asks if New Zealand Steel received millions of emission units for free under the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme industrial allocation provisions and yet still bought millions of the dubious international Russian units (ERUs) to make windfall arbitrage profits.

The Morgan Foundation's latest report "Climate Cheats" has been sizzling across the various media in the last four days.

The language of the report is refreshingly non-neutral and unashamedly emotive. It is in equal parts compelling and condemning.

Carbon credit scheme a farce, reported the Herald. Climate change cheating, said Radio New Zealand. Dodgy deals, climate swindle, climate fraudsters, junk carbon scam, said report author Geoff Simmons.

As a consequence, "Climate Cheats" is an easy and engaging read - no mean feat given the topic - that is also thoroughly well-researched. It really is a 'high integrity' credit to it's authors (if you pardon the pun).

In this post I want to look specifically at one particular type of corporate conduct - arbitrage profiteering - covered in "Climate Cheats".

Geoff Simmons, on page 28, describes arbitrage like this:

"Meanwhile polluters in New Zealand benefited through a collapse in the price of emissions, while some even creamed off profits by exploiting the price difference between different types of carbon credits."

How does an emitting company make an arbitrage profit in an emissions trading scheme? I think a data-driven worked example might be informative.

I will look at New Zealand Steel because their CEO was recently whining to Radio NZ that the NZ emissions trading scheme review would lead to higher carbon costs which would make the business less viable.

The data. I need to have the following:

• the number of free emission units allocated by the Ministry for the Environment to New Zealand Steel
• the quantity of New Zealand Steel's greenhouse gas emissions from processing steel from iron sands from the New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2013
• the number emission units to surrender under the NZETS, I estimate as half of the emissions under the "two-for-one" deal
• and the number of any of Geoff Simmons favourite dodgy Ukrainian or Russian Emission Reduction Units owned by New Zealand Steel, as compiled from the EPA Emission Unit Register.

Let me sum that up in a table.

New Zealand Steel free unit allocation, greenhouse gas emissions, and NZETS surrender liability and ERUs
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Units allocated	494,704	989,304	1,003,730	1,029,352	1,073,489
GHG emissions (t)	1,646,890	1,736,250	1,718,930	1,747,500	N/a
Estimate of units to surrender	411,722	868,125	868,125	873,750	N/a
Allocation less surrenders	82,982	121,179	135,605	155,602	N/a
Allocation/Liability (per cent)	120%	114%	116%	118%	N/a
Emission Reduction Units owned at 31 December	0	0	0	1,022,527	1,001,714

Let's visualise that dense data into a bar chart.

The first conclusion I draw from the chart is that from 2010 to 2014 New Zealand Steel's free allocation of emission units (the purple bars) materially exceeded their estimated liability to surrender units (the mid-pink bars) to match actual emissions.

The surplus units were not needed to compensate for increased energy costs caused by the NZETS as the NZETS did not cause any energy costs to increase. The free unit allocation was and is simply a transfer of wealth to New Zealand Steel in the form of a tradable right or voucher (the NZU emission unit) that is highly liquid.

The second conclusion is that although New Zealand Steel never needed to buy any extra emissions units to surrender under the NZETS, New Zealand Steel still owned about a million Emission Reduction Units at the end of both 2013 and 2014

So if New Zealand Steel always had more than enough free units to meet it's obligation to surrender units under the NZETS, why would it also buy international units? There is only one plausible answer. It is to make an arbitrage profit.

Why am I so sure New Zealand Steel carried out arbitrage trades with its NZUs and surrendered cheap dubious ERUs rather than the free gifted NZUs for 2013 and 2014? It's the maths.

Data from the Emissions Unit Register, NZEUR Holding & Transaction Summary, which I have summed into a Google sheet, tells us that for 2013 the total numbers of NZUs surrendered by all emitters was 732,667 and 576,470 NZUs were surrendered for 2014.

If New Zealand Steel had used its free NZUs to meet its 2013 unit surrender obligation, the number of NZUs would have to be roughly consistent with my estimate of half of it's emissions or 873,750 units. All NZETS emitters collectively surrendered fewer units (732,667) for 2013! It is mathematically impossible for New Zealand Steel to have met those surrender obligations with NZUs. It must have used ERUs.

Here is a hypothetical example of what New Zealand Steel might have done.

According to a Carbon Forest Services webpage that tracks emission unit prices, on 11 October 2013, New Zealand units (NZUs) had a market price of $4.20 each and the Russian or Ukrainian Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) had a market price of 35 cents each. One NZU was worth 12 times as much as an ERU.

If New Zealand Steel had purchased 1 million ERUs on 11 October 2013 at 35 cents each or $350,000, it could then surrender 873,750 of them to the Government to match it's 2013 emissions.

Based on that 'if', New Zealand Steel would then be in a position to sell all the 1,029,352 New Zealand units of the 2013 allocation at $4.20 each for a possible value of $4,323,278. The hypothetical profit would be $3,973,278.

Alternatively New Zealand Steel would keep the 1,029,352 NZUs and wait for their price to appreciate. In that case, the hypothetical but unrealised profit would be greater than $3,973,278.

That is just one possibility based on NZU and ERU prices on one date. I suggest you browse over to the Carbon Forest Services emission unit price chart and hover over it to see the differences between ERU and NZU prices from early 2013 to 2015.

Even when NZUs hit a historic low price of $1.60 in February 2013, they were still 9 times more valuable than ERUs. Choose your own combination of price difference and possible profit from buying ERUs and selling NZUs.

My final piece of evidence is Bluescope Steel Australia's 2015 concise annual financial report which includes New Zealand Steel's finances.

Note 6 Other Income says that in 2015 Carbon Permit income was $AUD 4.4 million. Footnote (a) says that the income is from the NZETS as the Australian Carbon Pricing scheme was abolished in July 2014.

Note 7 on page 63 says that 'Direct carbon emission expense' was a credit of $AUD 1 million.

Footnote (d) page 64 says that the current year carbon emission credit was due to the carbon 'true-up' of the Port Kembla steelworks.

So Bluescope Steel Australia made a carbon profit both sides of the Tasman! New Zealand Steel made $AUD 4.4 million out of the NZETS. So much for facing a carbon price at the margin!

Conclusion

New Zealand Steel really have achieved the ultimate emission trading scheme "two-for".

New Zealand Steel received a free allocation of emission units that is greater than the number needed to surrender for emissions. The availability of the cheaper imported Russian and Ukrainian international units highlighted by "Climate Cheats" gave New Zealand Steel the opportunity to make windfall arbitrage profits. New Zealand Steel did not pay a carbon price at the margin. New Zealand Steel probably made windfall arbitrage profits.

New Zealand Steel and the unethical two-for-one - free emission units and arbitrage profits from cheap Russian units

In this post there is still a gratuitous image of Marlon Brandon as the Godfather but the post is about one of New Zealand's biggest companies; New Zealand Steel. They just opposed the possible ending of the supposedly temporary "two-tonnes-for-one-unit" deal. That's a bit rich when their idea of the ideal "two-for" is to receive millions of emission units for free under the NZETS industrial allocation provisions and yet buy millions of the dubious international Russian units (ERUs) and make windfall arbitrage profits.

Well, back on 17 March we had the Chief Executive of New Zealand Steel whining to Radio NZ that the NZ emissions trading scheme review would lead to higher carbon costs which would make their business less viable

Chief Executive Andrew Garey told Radio New Zealand

"the removal of the 2 for 1 provison for big carbon dioxide emitters will undermine the viability of the business"

What is this two for one deal? On page 12 of the NZETS review discussion document, it states;

"The one-for-two surrender obligation allows participants from the liquid fossil fuels, industrial processes, stationary energy and waste sectors to surrender one unit for every two tonnes of emissions (ie, a 50 per cent surrender obligation)."

However, Garey has his facts wrong in assuming the loss of the two-for-one deal will increase his NZETS liability. On page 13 of the NZETS review discussion document, it states;

"It should be noted that if the one-for-two surrender obligation is removed, the amount of free allocation provided to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed activities will automatically be increased to correspond with the increased surrender obligation."

So New Zealand Steel will have to surrender twice as many units. But its free allocation of units will double. One bit of corporate welfare in the NZETS is removed and another takes its place! Talk about the NZETS as an insurance policy for big emitters that protects them from any incentive to reduce emissions!

I could respond by saying I sympathise with Mr Garey. I mean, really, who does understand the NZETS? However in his interview with Radio NZ he goes on to indicate that if the NZETS is toughened up, then his parent company, Bluescope Steel, may just decide to close the Glenbrook Steel Mill. Nice steel mill you got. Shame if something happens to it. That is just typical arrogant big business behaviour. So I have no sympathy for Mr Garey.

There are some obvious questions to try to answer with actual emission unit data from the New Zealand Emission Unit Register, which records legal title for all valid carbon credits/emissions units in the New Zealand. How many units were NZ Steel given for free under the industry allocation plans? What were NZ Steel's NZETS-liable greenhouse gas emissions from processing steel from iron sands? Were they allocated more units than they had to surrender? Did they also make arbitrage trades in any of the dubious Russian or Ukrainian emission units?

We know that New Zealand Steel has been receiving free allocations of emission units as the allocations are listed on the Ministry for the Environment's web page Industrial allocation decisions.

Another MfE web page Eligible industrial activities tells us the formula for the unit allocation is (LA × ∑ (PDCT × AB)) ÷ 2.

The level of assistance (LA) for New Zealand Steel is 90%. There are four products (PDCT) each with it's own allocative baseline (AB). The products and allocative baselines are 3.2613 units for each tonne of iron or steel, 0.119 units for each tonne of cast carbon steel, 0.28 units for each tonne of vanadium-bearing steel and 0.163 units for each tonne of flat hot-rolled carbon steel.

That page is just repeating what is in Regulation 23 and the Schedule Prescribed emissions intensity and allocative baselines of the Climate Change (Eligible Industrial Activities) Regulations 2010.

I have already compiled a Google sheet of all units allocated to emitters from 2010 to 2014. It was compiled from the year by year Industrial allocation decisions

We add a 'filter' to the Google sheet on the top row of the column headers and set the filter on the 'Applicants.Name' column header to 'NZ Steel'.

This tells us that New Zealand Steel Development Limited (account holder NZ-1903) received these free NZ units.

2010 494,704
2011 989,304
2012 1,003,730
2013 1,029,352
2014 1,073,489

Or a total of 4,590,579 units over the five years. NZ Steel received more units than any other industry. More than smelter operator NZ Aluminium Smelters Limited. I know this as back in 2012 I made a pie chart of the 2011 free unit allocation data. That showed that of the 3.472 million units allocated to industry in 2011, 90% went to thirteen NZ companies. Here is that pie chart.

Now I want data on the greenhouse gas emissions from processing steel from iron sands. The New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2013 reports the greenhouse gas emissions from steel production from iron sands in tonnes of CO₂-e. New Zealand Steel is the only iron sands processor so these are New Zealand Steel's emissions. The emissions are;

2010 1,646,890
2011 1,736,250
2012 1,718,930
2013 1,747,500

(There is no total for 2014 as we won't see the next greenhouse gas inventory for the 2014 year until later this year)

I want to compare the number of emissions surrendered with the number of units given as free allocation. Ideally, I would have the number of units actually surrendered by New Zealand Steel each year. In a transparent system we would know that, would we not? Unfortunately, the NZETS is not transparent and the units surrendered are not available to the public.

In 2013, I asked the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) under the Official Information Act for the numbers of units surrendered by New Zealand Steel and some other companies. The EPA refused my request on the grounds that the Climate Change Response Act trumped the Official Information Act. In May 2014, after a delay of a year, the Ombudsmens Office agreed with the EPA. So much for transparency.

So I have to estimate the unit surrender obligation. I keep in mind the two-for-one deal. So my annual estimate of the number of units New Zealand Steel is required to surrender under the NZETS is half of the actual emissions (one unit covers two tonnes). Also NZETS surrender obligations started on 1 July 2010. So 2010 was a half year for free allocation and unit surrenders. So I take half of the 2010 actual emissions.

My data now looks like this

                            2010      2011      2012      2013      2014
Greenhouse gas emissions     823,445 1,736,250 1,718,930 1,747,500        NA
NZETS surrender  obligations 411,722   868,125   859,465   873,750        NA
Free allocations of units    494,704   989,304 1,003,730 1,029,352 1,073,489

Lets make a chart. I think a bar chart will be a suitable choice. The colour scheme is lightest pink for actual emissions, mid-pink for my estimate of the units surrendered (emissions x 50%) and purple for the free allocation of units. The purple bars (free units) are noticeably larger than the surrender estimates. It appears that New Zealand Steel are consistently being allocated more free units than they need to surrender to match their direct emissions.

In summary, in the years 2010 to 2103, the actual number of units given to New Zealand Steel exceeded the estimated number to be surrendered by 82,982, 121,179, 144,265 and 155,602.

Does the free allocation of units include compensation for any other carbon-intensive energy inputs I have not taken into account? In principle, yes, as the original September 2007 Framework for a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme document makes this statement about free allocation to emitters;

"indirect emissions associated with the consumption of electricity, as well as direct emissions from stationary energy and direct emissions from non-energy industrial processes will be included in the concept of emissions from industrial producers".

Also the NZ Aluminium Smelter free allocation included an undisclosed quantum of units for the fictional coal content of electricity inherent in their energy supply from Lake Manapouri. Yes, I know that last sentence seems to make no sense at all. You really need to read the linked blog post!

The Heavy Industry Energy Demand Update Report (by Covec, Feb 2009) provides estimates of the carbon dioxide emissions from each energy input (except electricity) used by New Zealand Steel.

The Covec report estimates that in 2008 the coal emissions were 1,615,100 tonnes (93%), the natural gas emissions were 106,200 tonnes (6%), the coke emissions were 18,100 tonnes (1%) and the diesel emissions were 3,800 tonnes (0.22%). Adding up to 1,743,200 tonnes of direct emissions. Covec don't calculate the emissions content of the 426 GWh of grid electricity used in 2008.

The estimated natural gas emissions at about 100,000 tonnes per annum almost adds up to the 'surplus' allocated units which are between 120,000 to 155,000 tonnes annually. So its arguably plausible that part of the free allocation of units is to compensate New Zealand Steel for the increase in the cost of natural gas caused by the NZETS.

Except that there is no evidence that the price of natural gas or electricity or coal has increased because of the NZETS. And we have known that since 2011.

Covec's 2011 report 'Impacts of the NZ ETS: Actual vs Expected Effects' prepared for the 2011 ETS Review Panel could not find any increases in electricity, natural gas or coal prices caused by the NZETS.

Officials supporting the 2012 Finance and Expenditure Select Committee queried the five major electricity generating companies about NZETS costs flowing through into wholesale electricity prices. Their reply was;

"costs being passed through directly from the NZETS are not visible or distinguishable due to the wholesale market pricing mechanism and these costs are not directly passed through due to competition factors".

As the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme evaluation report 2016 states on page 38;

The prices of emission units have been too low to affect business costs either for participants or those who receive costs passed down from participants.

So from 2010 to 2014 New Zealand Steel consistently received a free allocation of emission units that materially exceeded their estimated liability to surrender units to match actual emissions. The surplus units were not needed to compensate for increased energy costs caused by the NZETS as the NZETS did not cause any energy costs to increase. The free unit allocation was and is simply a transfer of wealth to New Zealand Steel in the form of a tradable right or voucher (unit) that is highly liquid.

So New Zealand Steel, the emitter receiving the most free units in the NZETS, has faced no NZETS-related carbon price at the margin or in any sense. Instead of acting as a carbon price at the margin, the free unit industrial allocation regime in conjunction with the lack of energy cost pass-through has acted as an insurance policy or hedge contract - protecting New Zealand Steel from the carbon price!

This is the embodiment of fundamentally flawed design in the NZETS and it is symptomatic of the National Government's unethical approach of rewriting the NZETS to suit the whims of big business. It's also symptomatic of the earlier big business campaign that pressured the earlier Labour Government to drop a carbon tax and move to the inherently less transparent NZETS.

You would think that this case study into New Zealand Steel could not get worse. However, it does get worse. From 2013 to 2015 New Zealand Steel engaged in arbitrage profiteering using the most dubious international emission units, the Emission Reduction Units.

To see if New Zealand Steel has owned any Emission Reduction Units, we go to another Google sheet Kyoto Unit Holdings by Account 2008 - 2014 which compiles data from the EPA Emission Unit Register. We add a 'filter' to the Google sheet on the top row for 'NZ Steel Limited' on the 'Account.Holder' column of the Google sheet.

We find that New Zealand Steel Limited did own some Emission Reduction Units.

2013 1,022,527
2014 1,001,714

I have amended the bar chart and added the Emission Reduction Units owned by New Zealand Steel as extra orange bars. It is interesting to note that the number of ERUs is fairly close to the number of free NZUs. Both were more or less 1 million for 2013 and 2014.

We have fairly persuasive evidence that New Zealand Steel was consistently allocated more free units than it needed to surrender for its actual emissions. Therefore New Zealand Steel never needed to buy any extra emissions units to surrender under the NZETS. Yet New Zealand Steel owned about a million Emission Reduction Units at the end of both 2013 and 2014

So if New Zealand Steel always had more than enough free units to meet it's obligation to surrender units under the NZETS, why would it also buy international units? There is only one plausible answer. It is to make an arbitrage profit.

Why am I so sure New Zealand Steel surrendered cheap dubious ERUs rather than the free gifted NZUs for 2013 and 2014? It's the maths.

Data from the Emissions Unit Register, NZEUR Holding & Transaction Summary, which I have summed into another Google sheet, tells us that the total numbers of NZUs surrendered by all emitters were 732,667 in 2013 and 576,470 in 2014.

As those numbers (for the whole of the NZETS) are less than New Zealand Steel's estimated surrender obligations, it is mathmatically impossible for New Zealand Steel to have met its surrender obligations without having used ERUs.

Here is a hypothetical example of an arbitrage trade similar to what New Zealand Steel might have done. According to a Carbon Forest Services webpage that tracks emission unit prices, on 11 October 2013, New Zealand units (NZUs) (the same type of units allocated to New Zealand Steel) had a market price of $4.20 each. On the same day the Russian or Ukrainian Emission Reduction Units had a market price of 35 cents each. One ERU was worth only one twelfth the price of an NZU.

If New Zealand Steel had purchased 1 million ERUs on 11 October 2013 at 35 cents each or $350,000, it could then surrender 873,750 of them to the Government to match it's 2013 emissions. Based on that 'if', New Zealand Steel would then be in a position to sell all the 1,029,352 New Zealand units of the 2013 allocation at $4.20 each for a possible value of $4,323,278. The hypothetical profit would be $3,973,278.

That is just one possibility based on NZU and ERU prices on one date. I suggest you browse over to the Carbon Forest Services New Zealand Unit & Emission Reduction unit Chart and hover over the chart to see the differences between ERU and NZU prices from early 2013 to 2015. Even when NZUs hit a historic low price of $1.60 in February 2013, they were still 9 times more valuable than ERUs. Choose your own combination of price difference and possible profit from buying ERUs and selling NZUs.

It's not just me saying that this is unethical profiteering. Here are statements from forest consultant Ollie Belton, Herald Economics Editor Brian Fallow and Green MP Kennedy Graham.

Carbon forest consultant Ollie Belton said this;

"..trade exposed industries that were gifted up to 90% of their surrender obligations were able to meet all their obligations with the super cheap ERUs and bank the gifted NZUs. Since 2012, NZUs have had much higher market value than ERUs, generally more than five times as high, hence the arbitrage opportunity. Never have polluters had it so good. They have made hundreds of millions in arbitrage profits."

Brian Fallow of the Herald described the arbitrage trades as corporate welfare.

"This is where the corporate welfare comes in. The ETS is designed to ensure that large emissions-intensive trade-exposed operations like the Tiwai Point smelter or the Glenbrook steel mill are only exposed to a carbon price at the margin - and a pretty narrow margin at that...But the collapse in international carbon prices has presented the smokestack sector with an arbitrage opportunity too.
They have been able to hoard their NZUs, in the expectation they will be more valuable in the future, and meet their obligations in the meantime with cheap imported Kyoto units instead".

.

Kennedy Graham placed it on the record at Parliament that he regarded the arbitrage trades as morally reprehensible.

"Emission-intensive, trade-exposed entities, which include aluminium, iron, steel, cement, whey, wood, and paper, are free to bank profits from the emissions trading scheme — cash for pollution. They receive free allocations of New Zealand Units as compensation for any energy price rises brought about by the emissions trading scheme...
These industries are also required to surrender units to clear liabilities. This is dependent on calculations based on their emissions profile. They can surrender New Zealand Units or Kyoto Units, such as emission reduction units and certified emission reduction units. These overseas units are valued between 10c and 40c.
They are engaging in the arbitrage by receiving free New Zealand Units from the Government, then selling them at market prices of $3 to $4, then buying cheaper overseas units such as the certified emission reduction units and emission reduction units for anything from 10c to 40c to surrender back to the Government.
They bank the profit. In some cases, this is in addition to existing tax-paid subsidies running into the tens of millions of dollars. Let me acknowledge that these activities are entirely legally, but they are morally reprehensible and they reflect Government stupidity and cynicism of the highest order".

Conclusion

New Zealand Steel really have achieved the ultimate emission trading scheme "two-fer". The NZETS's free allocation regime over allocates them more emission units than they need to surrender for their emissions and the availability of the imported international units gave them the opportunity to make windfall arbitrage profits. So instead of a carbon price there were unearned windfall profits.

I agree completely with Ollie Belton, Brian Fallow and Kennedy Graham that such arbitrage profiteering is morally reprehensible corporate welfare where the polluters have never had it so good. It seems that the more free emission units you give a company, the more it abuses the privilege of having an emissions trading scheme. This is just one example of how deeply unethical the implementation of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme has been. The scheme is now so morally tainted it has no valid ethical basis to continue. The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme should be abandoned.