Fixing the NZ emissions trading scheme is just flogging a dead horse

I argue that trying to incrementally 'save' or 'fix' the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme will ensure it remains ineffective in reducing domestic emissions for decades. Politically, its just flogging the dead horse. We don't have time for a unending institutionalised cultural conflict over the 'fixing the NZETS' like the one we have had for 'fixing' the Resource Management Act.

Yes, following on from my last post I am still banging on about the latest review of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme.

Elsewhere on the web I see that Brian Fallow, Generation Zero and Geoff Simmons are all accepting the “fix the NZETS” framing in their comments on the review. Geoff Simmons heads up his second post on the ETS review in two days How do we save the Emissions Trading Scheme?.

Brian Fallow starts his Herald column "Possible adjustments to the Emissions Trading Scheme aren’t much, but at least they’d be a start".

Geoff Simmons and Brian Fallow do a double act of analysis on the NZETS review. I totally respect both Geoff and Brian in their intentions and views and understanding of the NZETS, except that they are both accepting this inherently incremental "fix the NZETS" framing of the politics. Here's their discussion.

I think this framing, 'fixing the NZETS' is fundamentally wrong in it’s politics.

One key point from my last post was that this NZETS review has reversed the burden of proof. The allegedly temporary and allegedly transitional 'moderating features' are now the status quo or the default settings in the NZETS.

Policy analysis and assessment now has to be prepared and presented to show that each flawed 'moderating feature' of the NZETS won't harm business interests. Queue the technical report Economic impacts of removing NZ ETS transitional measures by New Zealand Institute of Economic Research.

We need to remember there are a lots of 'cost moderating' features (flaws) still in the NZETS: unlimited international linkage and importing of overseas units (which officials are trying to restore), overly generous free allocation of units, the hang-over of surplus units in the market, the lack of auctioning (well there is no point having an auction if there is a huge surplus of units).

And the ultimate flaw is that half of New Zealand's greenhouse gas emissions, those from pastoral agriculture, seem to have a permanent get-out-of jail card.

So we have an emissions trading scheme with multiple flaws. The politically selected burden of proof provides a high hurdle for change each time the hapless officials attempt to remove the flaws. All the lobbyists join in as they have all the dates in their calendars.

You need more convincing?. Let's look at one of Tim Groser’s last statements as Minister for Climate Change.

First Groser praises Labour for their shared consensus on having an emissions trading scheme.

We have an understanding that there are certain policy frameworks in New Zealand which take decades to put in place, and where you need a very high degree of consensus - particularly amongst the two major parties of Labour and National - on at least a structure of a policy response.

Labour have supped the kool-aid and bought into this framing. As shown by this statement to Forest and Bird during the 2014 election campaign.

Labour’s preferred means of pricing is to fix the the existing ETS. Using an ETS to price carbon is the only broad area of agreement in climate change policy, particularly particularly between the two largest parties (despite National’s lip service for an ETS). Labour would not throw that agreement away lightly to start again with a carbon tax.

In other words, Labour will flog the dead horse better than National. As I noted in 2014:

National and Labour in effect have the same policy narrative that explains the problem; 'THEY undermined the NZETS', and a narrative solution, 'WE will fix the NZETS'. This creates the on-going cycle of the 'horse is under performing' and the narrative solution (keep flogging the horse). But beneath the impenetrable detail and complexity of the arguments about fixing the NZETS, it will remain ineffective.

Groser saves his well-known invective for Russel Norman and the Greens and their carbon tax policy. And stretches a very long bow to equate that policy with the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd Australian Labor Prime Ministers' revolving door.

What I didn't appreciate was that Russel Norman - then leader of the Green Party - saying you want to throw the policy structure away and have a carbon tax... I can guarantee you what that would have done - it would have set us back on a cycle of internal political conflict, which would have repeated exactly the problem in Australia.

Groser concluded:

I do not believe there is anything fundamentally wrong with the emissions trading scheme'.

I rest my case that the best science-based and ethically based climate mitigation policy is the opposite of what Groser says!

I hope Geoff Simmons is ready to do another decade's worth of white board Fridays emissions trading for dummies.

A 'horse-flogging' process of 'fixing the NZETS' will last a very long time - if it ever concludes. It could just become a social and cultural institution like the never-ending debate over the Resource Management Act. In a previous post I used the metaphor of a flogging the dead horse after the snake swallows the elephant in the room to describe this possibility.

Applying the maths of our carbon budgets, Kevin Anderson's analysis and the Paris Agreement, we just don’t have enough time for a never-ending institutionalised horse flogging debate over the NZ emissions trading scheme. The political goal must be to remove the social licence of the NZETS, to de-legitimize it in the eyes of the public and then to scrap it so a simple carbon tax can be adopted instead.

Is it ‘doing our fair share’ to use creative accounting to meet New Zealand’s 2020 climate change target?

I look at how the National Government intends to use creative carbon accounting to ensure that New Zealand meets it’s 2020 climate change target (a five percent reduction) in spite of a projected trend of increasing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) to 2020.

On 10 April 2015, when he was releasing the latest inventory of greenhouse gases, the Minister for Climate Change Issues Tim Groser made this very confident statement; “We’re well on track to meet our 2020 target"

That target is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to five per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.

When this was announced in 2013 the ambition (-5%) of the target was criticised as useless, pathetic and inadequate.

The five percent reduction stands in stark contrast to the Ministry for the Environments projections of increasing emissions out to 2020. The Ministry estimates that the increase in gross (total) emissions in 2020 will be 29% above the 1990 baseline (from 60 to 77 million tonnes) and the increase in net emissions (gross less any increase in the stock of carbon stored in forests) to 2020 will be 130% (from 33 to 75 million tonnes). So why is Tim Groser so confident that the target will be achieved?

Simon Terry of the Sustainability Council has commented on the ‘kicking the can down the road’ features of the Government’s climate change policies: the mismatch between the emissions target and the predicted emissions, the absence of a credible plan or carbon budget approach and the deferring of liabilities into the future.

Taking Simon Terry’s work as a starting point, I am going to look at how the Government intends to apply the accounting rules for carbon credits to achieve the 2020 target in spite of the likely predicted increase in gross and net greenhouse gas emissions.

So how is New Zealand going to reduce emissions by five percent by 2020?

In December 2014, at the climate change conference in Lima, Peru, our climate ambassador Jo Tyndall was asked that specific question. Her answer was that New Zealand was going to achieve the 2020 target and reduce emissions through a combination of four methods;

1. domestic emissions reductions,
2. removal of carbon dioxide by forests,
3. participation in international carbon markets and,
4. recognising surplus emissions units from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

Domestic emissions reductions are unlikely. In 2013, Tim Groser told the Herald that his "strong advice" from officials was that the 2020 target could be met without any changes to settings of the New Zealand emissions trading scheme (or "ETS"). The relevant Cabinet Paper for the 2020 target also states that the 2020 target can be met without changing policies or ETS costs. In other words, the ETS will remain in its current induced coma, and stay ineffective in reducing domestic emissions.

New Zealand can’t meet the target by buying carbon credits from international carbon markets as access was blocked at the Doha meeting because we didn’t sign up to a formal Kyoto Protocol second commitment period target.

That leaves two ways of meeting the 2020 target; removal of carbon dioxide by forests, and recognising surplus units from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. I will look at the removal of carbon dioxide by forests next.

Forest carbon and Kyoto gross-net carbon accounting

By saying “removal of carbon dioxide by forests”, politicians and officials actually mean that carbon credits will be accounted for using the Kyoto Protocol’s gross-net forest carbon accounting rule.

This sounds innocuous, if a bit sleep-inducing. It is in fact a method of creative accounting that New Zealand has already relied on to meet the 2008-2012 Kyoto first commitment period target.

The 'baseline’, 1990 emissions, is “gross” - the sum of all emissions without subtracting any “credit” for carbon absorbed into sinks such as growing forests and land use changes. The target (2008 to 2012) emissions are “net", as credits for carbon absorbed in growing forests are recognised and are subtracted from the gross emissions. This is called gross-net accounting. This makes the comparison between baseline and target inconsistent - it is not an “apples with apples” comparison.

I have blogged on this before but Professor Martin Manning, an IPCC author and formerly of the Climate Change Research Institute at Victoria University of Wellington, explained it better in 2012.

"..achieving the Kyoto Protocol target can be quite misleading because it compares net emissions over the first commitment period, 2008 – 2012, with the gross emissions in 1990. If one compares the net emissions in 2012 with those for 1990, then the increase in New Zealand has actually been more than 100%."

The National Government intends to repeat this gross net accounting for the 2013 to 2020 target. As long as forest growth exceeds deforestation, this will allow both net and gross emissions to increase up to the quantity of carbon absorbed in forests that was ignored in the 1990 baseline.

The Climate Action Tracker website thinks the credit for carbon absorbed in forests could be up to 25 million tonnes CO2e a year and the ‘recognition’ (under Kyoto rules) of all the units would allow New Zealand's gross emissions to increase up to 35% above the 1990 baseline.

Surplus Kyoto units from first Commitment Period 2008 - 2012

Jo Tyndall’s final method of achieving the 2020 target is to recognise surplus emission units from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. According to the latest Ministry for the Environment net position statement for the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand will finish the first commitment period (2008-2012) with a surplus of 90.8 million units.

Even though New Zealand has no formal 2013-2020 Kyoto ‘commitment’, New Zealand intends to ‘carry over’ millions of these surplus Kyoto units to the 2013-2020 period in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol rules.

The carry-over rules are of course complicated, but I calculate that NZ will be able to ‘carry over’ almost all of them - 86 million units of the various types of units (see final paragraph - Appendix ‘Carry-over’ of Kyoto first period units).

What’s wrong with having a surplus of units? An effective emissions trading scheme with a real cap would never have surplus units. Units would be scarce and realistically priced. A surplus of units is of itself evidence of a failed implementation of cap and trade frameworks such as Kyoto and the EU ETS.

A surplus of units is one consequence of emissions trading with no cap, unlimited access to international carbon markets and over-allocation of units to industry and a rock-bottom unit price. Which is exactly what we have had with the NZ ETS.

We need to remind ourselves why NZ has a surplus of units for the Kyoto Protocol first period. Although net and gross emissions increased, NZ gained surplus units by using the gross-net forest carbon accounting rule and allowing the nearly unlimited import of low-priced international units with dubious integrity which were surrendered by ETS participants to match their emissions.

According to Climate Analytics, internationally, the Kyoto first commitment period ended with 14 billion surplus units; enough to allow all the signatory countries to “comply” with their 2020 targets without restricting business as usual emissions growth.

And this is exactly what the Government intends to do.

Each Kyoto unit carried forward will be counted towards NZ’s 2020 target and will allow an additional tonne of domestic GHG emissions above the 1990 baseline.

Similarly, each carbon credit recognised for carbon absorbed in forests between 2013 and 20120 will be counted towards NZ’s 2020 target and will allow an additional tonne of domestic GHG emissions above the 1990 baseline.

Our politicians and bureaucrats could have focused on policies to reduce domestic emissions to meet the 2020 target. Achieving the 2020 target won’t be an outcome of policies to reduce emissions. Like fixing the emissions trading system. It will be an outcome of the accounting rules chosen for the carbon credits the Government can hold. That’s called creative accounting.

Appendix “Carry-over” of Kyoto first period units

The Kyoto Protocol has “carry-over” rules for unused units at the end of the 2008 - 2012 first commitment period. Some surplus units may be 'carried over’ to the second commitment period and then be used to comply with a country’s official commitment. Although NZ has not taken up a Kyoto second period commitment, NZ none the less intends to mimic the application of Kyoto rules designed to carry over surplus units from CP1 to CP2.

NZ will have a surplus of 91million units after transferring 378 million units to a cancellation account for the 378 million tonnes of emissions between 2008 and 2012.

There are limits on which and how many units can be “carried over”. All assigned amount units (AAUs) can be carried over; forest removal units (RMUs) cannot be carried over, carry-over of Certified Emission Reduction units(CERS) and Emission Reduction Units(ERUs) are limited to 2.5% of NZ’s initial assigned amount or 7.7 million each. See the UNFCCC Reference Manual

The Government will probably prefer to retire units that cannot be carried over in order to maximise the number it may carry forward.

On that basis, all 72 million RMUs will be cancelled, 37.3 millions CERs and 37.3 million ERUs will be cancelled, leaving 7.7 million each of CERs and ERUs carried forward. Then 231.4 AAUs need to be cancelled to make up to 378 million units.

The total carried over will be 86 million units composed of 7.7 million CERs, 7.7 million ERUs and 70.6 AAUs.

John Key and Tim Groser on the wrong side of history - Kennedy Graham

Kennedy Graham gave a great speech in response to the annual Prime Minister's statement. This is the full speech

"Lord Nicholas Stern acknowledged just days ago that he had "got it wrong". Climate change is already far worse than he thought it would be only 6 years ago when he released his report."

"We are no longer likely to achieve the 2 degrees Celsius limit that the international community set for itself only 2 years ago. We are now on target for 3.5 degrees to 6 degrees. That takes us beyond the dangerous dimension of climate change, which the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change sought to prevent, and into what the World Bank calls "cataclysmic" climate change."

"What to say to a Government that in face of these developments guts its domestic climate legislation and refuses to enter a second binding international commitment period?"

"What to say to a Prime Minister who, in his annual statement to Parliament, omits climate change on the grounds that he touched on it last year?"

"What to say to a Minister for Climate Change Issues who says that New Zealand is ahead of the curve, that it is time to move beyond the Kyoto Protocol and join the largest polluters of the world, and who derides the global civil society when it criticises New Zealand for being one of the chief obstacles to progress at the UN conference in Doha?"

"We say this to John Key and Tim Groser. We say this: you are on the wrong side of history, both of you, in your respective ways."

Kia kaha, Kennedy!

New Zealand's double dealing and special pleading over the Kyoto Protocol second period and the Doha hooha Part 1

Is Tim Groser a Kyoto pariah? Or a Kyoto visonary? A global emissions reduction emissary or is he tar-sanded with a Canadian brush? I try to make sense of New Zealand's double dealing and special pleading over the Kyoto Protocol second commitment period and the Doha climate change talks hooha.

I am very confused about New Zealand's climate change policy since the Doha international climate change talks (COP18) and New Zealand opting out of a second period of the Kyoto Protocol back on 9 November 2012.

The Kyoto part two opt-out is described as a lose-lose decision that shuts New Zealand out of the Kyoto international carbon markets and is a shambles and a disgrace.

So I have a question for all you climate change blog readers.

If Minister of Climate Change Tim Groser is serious about New Zealand's 2020 greenhouse gas target, why would he forego formally lodging the 2020 target into the existing Kyoto Protocol framework (where the national institutions and arrangements are already up and running), in favour of pledging to meet the target on a voluntary basis?

Let me break that question down into several parts.

1. Imagine you are the Minister for Climate Change in the government of a small developed nation.
2. This nation has signed an international treaty with a few other nations which states a short-term national target for emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs).
3. This nation enacts the treaty by creating some new institutions; a national register for emissions units, national inventories of GHG emissions, national surveys of afforestation, and public servants to report the predicted progress towards the national target.
4. The nation has adopted several policies relying on the treaty institutions; an emissions trading scheme, forest sink schemes, research alliances, and international trading of emissions units.
5. The nation has a second publicly stated medium-term target for GHGs for the years following the expiry of the first target.

If you are serious about that second GHG target, why would you pledge the target on a voluntary basis, when you could have formally lodged your target into the existing treaty (where the national institutions and arrangements already exist)?

Any answers? Anyone? Would you like to phone a friend?

Okay, here's a hint. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment has said that we are on track to exceed the 1990 GHGs baseline by 30% rather than meet the 2020 target of reducing GHGs by 10 to 20% compared to 1990.

Now just because New Zealand's net emissions are likely to consistently increase through to 2020 doesn't automatically mean New Zealand would not meet the 2020 target if translated into a Kyoto second commitment period target. We could just buy extra emissions units from the international Kyoto carbon markets.

That is, if there was a sensibly designed emissions trading scheme. Such a scheme would be 100% "emitter pays", with emitters making their own market-based decisions to either reduce emissions or to buy the emissions units. Well we certainly don't have that.

So my conclusion is that it is not just that Tim Groser has absolutely no intention doing anything domestically to achieve the 2020 target of a 10 to 20% reduction in GHGs. Groser and National also have absolutely no intention of imposing any real carbon price on New Zealand's industrial and agricultural emitters.